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Abstract
Parametric down-conversion (PDC) sources can be used for quantum key distribution (QKD).
One can use a PDC source as a triggered single photon source. Recently, there are various practical
proposals of the decoy state QKD with triggering PDC sources. In this paper, we generalize
the passive decoy state idea, originally proposed by Mauerer and Silberhorn. The generalized
passive decoy state idea can be applied to cases where either threshold detectors or photon number
resolving detectors are used. The decoy state protocol proposed by Adachi, Yamamoto, Koashi and
Imoto (AYKI) can be treated as a special case of the generalized passive decoy state method. By
simulating a recent PDC experiment, we compare various practical decoy state protocols with the
infinite decoy protocol and also compare the cases using threshold detectors and photon-number
resolving detectors. Our simulation result shows that with the AYKI protocol, one can achieve a
key generation rate that is close to the theoretical limit of infinite decoy protocol. Furthermore,
our simulation result shows that a photon-number resolving detector appears to be not very useful
for improving QKD performance in this case. Although our analysis is focused on the QKD with
PDC sources, we emphasize that it can also be applied to other QKD setups with triggered single
photon sources.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] allows two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to
create a random secret key even when the channel is accessible to an eavesdropper, Eve. The
security of QKD is built on the fundamental laws of physics in contrast to existing classical
public key encryption schemes that are based on unproven computational assumptions.
Bennett and Brassard proposed a best-known protocol — BB84 [1]. Proving the security
of QKD is a hard problem. Fortunately, this problem has been solved in the last decade,
see for example, [3, 4, 5, 6]. Many security proofs are based on the assumption of idealized
QKD system components, such as a perfect single photon source and well-characterized
detectors. In practice, inevitable device imperfections may compromise the security unless
these imperfections are well investigated. Meanwhile, the security of QKD with realistic
devices has been proven. See [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] for example.
In the original proposal of BB84 protocol, a single photon source is used. Unfortunately,
single photon sources are still not commercially available with current technology. Alterna-
tively, a weak coherent state is widely used as a photon source. We call this implementation
coherent state QKD. Many coherent state QKD experiments have been done since the first
QKD experiment [13].
The coherent state QKD suffers from photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks [9, 14, 15].
Nevertheless, it has been proven unconditionally secure by Inamori, Lu¨tkenhaus and Mayers
[10]. This work is improved by Gottesman, Lo, Lu¨tkenhaus, and Preskill (GLLP) [12],
though the performance in terms of the achievable secure distance and the key rate is
limited.
Decoy state method [16] has been proposed to improve the performance of the coherent
state QKD. The security of QKD with decoy states has been proven [17, 18, 19]. The
simulation result shows us that the coherent state QKD with decoy states is able to operate
as good as QKD with perfect single photon sources in the sense that the key generation
rates given by both setups depend linearly on the channel transmittance [19]. Afterwards,
some practical decoy-state protocols with only one or two decoy states are proposed [20],
see also [21, 22, 23]. The experimental demonstrations for decoy state method have been
done recently [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29].
The motivation of decoy states is to estimate the channel properties (e.g., transmittance
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and error proability) better. To do that, Alice uses extra states with different light intensities
during key transmission. Then Alice and Bob can consider detection statistics from signal
and decoy states separately, from which they can estimate the channel transmittance and
error probability better. We call the situation when Alice actively prepare decoy states
active decoy state method to differentiate from the passive decoy state method where Alice
choose decoy and signal states by passive measurements. Details can be found in Section
IV. We note that in coherent state QKD, one can only use active decoy state method.
Other than the decoy state method, we remark that there are other approaches to enhance
the performance of the coherent state QKD, such as QKD with strong reference pulses
[30, 31] and differential-phase-shift QKD [32].
Besides a coherent state source, a parametric down-conversion (PDC) source can be used
for QKD as well. There are two ways to use a PDC source for QKD. The first is to use it as
a triggered (heralded) single photon source. Alice detects one of the two modes from a PDC
source as a trigger [47] and actively encodes her qubit information into another mode. We
call this implementation triggering PDC QKD. The second way is to use it as an entangled
photon source for entanglement-based QKD protocols. See Ref. [33] and references cited
therein. We call this implementation entanglement PDC QKD.
The triggering PDC QKD, similar to the coherent state QKD, suffers from PNS attacks.
By applying the GLLP security proof, one can find that the optimal average photon number
µ is in the same order of overall transmittance η. Then the key generation rate will be on the
order of η2. For a rigorous derivation, one can refer to Appendix A. Thus, the performance
of the triggering PDC QKD is very limited.
Since decoy states idea can substantially enhance the performance of the coherent state
QKD, a natural question will be: “can decoy states idea be applied to the triggering PDC
QKD?” The answer is yes. One can apply the infinite decoy state idea [19] to the triggering
PDC QKD. Not surprisingly, with decoy states, the key generation rate can be O(η), which
is the same as the order achieved by a single-photon source. Therefore, we expect the decoy
state QKD to become a standard technique not only in the coherent state QKD, but also
in QKD with triggering PDC sources. The infinite decoy state protocol requires an infinite
number of decoy states to be used, which is not practical. A few practical decoy proposals for
triggering PDC requiring a finite number of decoy states have been proposed [34, 35, 36, 37].
We are interested in comparing various protocols for the triggering PDC QKD. Among
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the practical decoy protocols for triggering PDC QKD, we find that the one proposed by
Adachi, Yamamoto, Koashi and Imoto (AYKI) [35] is simple to implement. The AYKI
protocol is conceptually similar to the one-decoy-state scheme [20]. In the AYKI protocol,
Alice and Bob only need to consider the statistics of triggered and non-triggered detection
events [48] separately, instead of preparing new signals for decoy states. We emphasize that
the AYKI protocol is easy to implement since there is no need for a hardware change.
Other decoy state proposals for the triggering PDC QKD require hardware modifications.
For example, the one proposed by Mauerer and Silberhorn [34] requires photon-number
resolving detectors, and the one proposed by Wang, Wang and Guo [36] requires Alice’s
pumping the laser source at various intensities.
We generalize the passive decoy state idea proposed by Mauerer and Silberhorn [34]. The
main idea is that, Bob can group his detection events according to the public announcement
of Alice’s detection events. For example, when Alice uses a threshold detector, Bob can group
his detection results according to whether Alice gets a detection or not. The generalized
passive decoy state idea can be applied to both cases of using threshold detectors and
photon-number resolving detectors. The AYKI protocol can be treated as a special case of
the generalized passive decoy state protocol.
By simulating a recent PDC experiment [38], we compare one case with a perfect photon-
number resolving detector and four cases with threshold detectors: no decoy, infinite decoy,
weak decoy and AYKI. Our simulation result shows that in a large parameter regime, the
performance of AYKI protocol is close to that of the infinite decoy protocol and thus there
is not much room left for improvement after the AYKI protocol has been implemented.
Also, the QKD performance of the case with the infinite decoy protocol using threshold
detectors is close to the case using a perfect photon-number resolving detector. Thus, a
photon-number resolving detector appears to be not very useful for triggering PDC QKD.
We emphasize that one advantage of passive decoy state method is that by passively
choosing decoy and signal states, the possibility that Eve can distinguish decoy and signal
states is reduced. On the other hand, in active (regular) decoy state experiments, it is more
difficult to verify the assumption that Eve cannot distinguish decoy and signal states.
We note that the passive decoy state idea can be combined to the active decoy state idea.
In Ref. [37], the authors gave a special case of combining passive and active decoy state
ideas. Note that for coherent state QKD, one can only use active decoy state methods.
4
Although our analysis is focussed on the QKD with PDC source, we emphasize that it
can also be applied to QKD setups with other triggered single photon sources.
In Section II, we will review the experiment setup of the triggering PDC QKD. In Sec-
tion III, we give a model for the triggering PDC QKD. In Section IV, we will study vari-
ous post-processing schemes for the triggering PDC QKD. In Section V, we will compare
various schemes of the triggering PDC QKD: non-decoy+threshold detectors, infinite de-
coy+threshold detectors, AYKI and the case with a perfect photon-number resolving detec-
tor, by simulating a real PDC experiment. In Appendix A, we consider the optimal PDC
source intensities for the triggering PDC QKD.
II. EXPERIMENT SETUP
In triggering PDC QKD, a PDC source is used as a triggered single photon source [49].
The schematic diagram is shown in FIG. 1.
 
Alice 
 
PDC 
 
PBS 
DA 
PC 
Bob 
Channel 
DB0 
PC DB1 PBS 
FIG. 1: A schematic diagram for the triggering PDC QKD. Alice collects photon pairs emitted
from a PDC source and uses a polarized beam splitter (PBS) to separate two polarization modes.
She detects one of the two modes with her detector (DA) as a trigger, modulates the polarization
of the other mode by a polarization controller (PC) and sends it to Bob. On Bob’s side, he chooses
his basis by a PC and performs a measurement by his detectors (DB0 and DB1).
As shown in FIG. 1, a PDC source generates two modes of photons, which can be sep-
arated by a polarized beam splitter (PBS). One mode goes to Alice’s own detector (DA in
FIG. 1) as the triggering signal and the other mode is used as a triggered single photon
state for the QKD. When Alice’s detector (DA) clicks, we call it a trigger. We divide the
detection events on Bob’s side into two groups depending on whether Alice gets a trigger or
not: triggering detection events and non-triggering detection events.
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Note that Alice can use either a threshold detector or a photon-number resolving detector
(DA in FIG. 1). She only needs to know the number of photons in the trigger mode. So
only one detector is sufficient on Alice’s side. Due to the high channel losses, without
Eve’s interference, Bob is highly likely to receive a vacuum or single photon state. Thus
it is sufficient for Bob to use threshold detectors. Threshold single photon detectors can
only tell whether there a click or not, but not the photon numbers. Bob needs to identify
polarizations of incoming photons. Here we assume Alice encodes qubit information in
photon polarizations.
In real experiments, there are two types of PDC sources. In triggering PDC QKD, both
of these two types can be used. Here we assume Alice uses type-II PDC source. The
Hamiltonian of the type-II PDC process in the triggering setup shown in FIG. 1 can be
written as [39]
H = iχa†b† + h.c. (1)
where h.c. means Hermitian conjugate and χ is a coupling constant which depends on the
crystal nonlinearity and the amplitude of the pump beam. The operators a†, b† and a, b are
the creation and annihilation operators of two modes with different polarizations.
The state coming from a triggering PDC source, with a Hamiltonian of Eq. (1), can be
written as [39]
|Ψ〉 = (coshχ)−1
∞∑
n=0
(tanhχ)n|n, n〉. (2)
Here we assume the state is single-mode. The expected photon pair number is given by
µ = sinh2 χ. The probability to get an n-photon-pair is
P (n) =
µn
(1 + µ)n+1
. (3)
Here we assume that the PDC source always sends out photon pairs. That is, the photon
number of mode a and b are always the same.
There is a nonzero probability for the PDC source to emit more than one photon pairs
in one pulse. Thus, Alice may send out multi photon states after she encodes basis and key
information by her polarization controller (PC). This is the reason why the triggering PDC
QKD suffers from PNS attacks.
Let us compare triggering PDC QKD and entanglement PDC QKD implementations.
For the setup of entanglement PDC QKD, one can refer to Ref. [33]. In the triggering PDC
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QKD Alice actively encodes the key information, while in the entanglement PDC QKD
Alice measures the polarization of one mode of PDC source directly. The advantage of the
triggering PDC QKD here is that it does not rely on the polarization correlations between
two modes of the PDC source. It only requires photon-pair generation of the source, which
means entanglement between photon pairs are not important for triggering PDC QKD.
However, in entanglement PDC QKD implementation, the entanglement between two modes
has to be well maintained for QKD transmission. We notice that maintaining entanglement
in real experiments is a highly non-trivial task [50].
III. MODEL
Lu¨tkenhaus has already studied the model of triggering PDC QKD [8] with threshold
detectors. His model is similar to the one of the coherent state QKD, except for a different
photon number distribution. For the model of the coherent state QKD, one can refer to
Ref. [8, 20]. For the model of entanglement PDC QKD, one can refer to Ref. [33].
A. Photon number channel model
Here we will use the photon number channel model [19]: Alice and Bob have infinite
number of channels. For channel i, Alice uses i-photon states (Fock states) to carry the
qubit information, with i = 0, 1, 2 · · · . The ith channel corresponds to the case when Alice’s
photon source emits an i-photon state. Thus, the probability for Alice to use the ith channel
is determined by the photon source. For example, in coherent state QKD, the probability
for Alice using the different channels follows a Poisson distribution. For the details of the
photon number channel model, one can refer to Ref. [20].
We define the yield Yi to be the probability for Bob to get a detection event conditioned
on Alice using the ith channel. As discussed in Section II, we assume that Bob uses a
threshold detector. The yield is given by
Yi = 1− (1− Y0B)(1− η)
i, (4)
where Y0B is the background count rate of Bob’s detection system, and η is the overall
detection probability for Bob, which takes into account the channel transmission efficiency,
the coupling efficiency, the detector efficiency and the other losses in Bob’s box.
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The error rate when Alice uses ith channel is given by
eiYi = edYi + (e0 − ed)Y0B (5)
where e0 = 1/2 is the error rate of background counts, ed is the intrinsic detector error rate
on Bob’s side (e.g., due to misalignment) and Yi is given by Eq. (4). Here, we neglect the
case where both background counts and true signal click since η and Y0B are small. We
remark that Eqs. (4) and (5) are true for both triggered and non-triggered cases.
B. On Alice’s side
In the triggering PDC QKD, Alice may use either a threshold detector or a photon-
number resolving detector. Define an N-photon-resolving detector to be a detector that can
tell 0, 1, · · · , N photons of incoming signal. For a threshold detector, we have N = 1, which
can only tell there are photons presenting or not. Given an incoming i-photon state, the
probability for Alice’s detector to indicate a j-photon state is ηj|i, with
∑j=N
j=0 ηj|i = 1 for
all i = 0, 1, · · · . In general, ηj|i’s are real numbers in [0,1]. We define a j-photon trigger for
the case that Alice’s detector indicates a j-photon state.
For a triggered PDC photon source, as given in Eq. (2), the probability for Alice’s detector
to indicate a j-photon detection is
PAj =
∞∑
i=0
µi
(1 + µ)i+1
ηj|i. (6)
With the assumption that the PDC source always emits photon pairs, the probability (gain)
for Alice getting a j-photon detection and Bob getting a detection is
Qµ,j =
∞∑
i=0
Qi,j
=
∞∑
i=0
µi
(1 + µ)i+1
ηj|iYi,
(7)
where the yield Yi is given in Eq. (4). The quantum bit error rate (QBER) conditioned on
Alice’s j-photon detection, similar to Eq. (7), is given by
Eµ,jQµ,j =
∞∑
i=0
Qi,jei
=
∞∑
i=0
µi
(1 + µ)i+1
ηj|iYiei.
(8)
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where the error rate ei is given in Eq. (5).
One observation is that in the triggering PDC QKD setup, shown in FIG. 1, the quantities
Yi and ei are independent of Alice’s measurement outcome j. This is based on the single-
mode PDC source assumption described in Eq. (1) in Section II. Therefore, in Section IV,
we can apply the decoy state idea.
C. Threshold detector
Here we will discuss a special case that Alice uses a threshold detector. That is,
η0|i = (1− Y0A)(1− ηA)
i
≃ (1− ηA)
i
η1|i = 1− η0|i
ηj|i = 0, ∀j ≥ 2,
(9)
where Y0A and ηA are the background count rate and the detector efficiency on Alice’s side.
The approximation is due to the fact that normally we have ηA ≫ Y0A. That is, we neglect
the background contributions on Alice’s side.
According to Eqs. (7) and (8), without Eve’s interference, the gains and QBER’s of
triggered (j = 1) and non-triggered (j = 0) detections are given by
Qµ,0 =
1
1 + ηAµ
−
1− Y0B
1 + (ηA + η − ηAη)µ
Qµ,1 = 1−
1
1 + ηAµ
−
1− Y0B
1 + ηµ
+
1− Y0B
1 + (ηA + η − ηAη)µ
Eµ,0Qµ,0 = edQµ|0 +
(e0 − ed)Y0B
1 + ηAµ
Eµ,1Qµ,1 = edQµ|1 +
(e0 − ed)ηAµY0B
1 + ηAµ
.
(10)
Without Eve’s interference, the gains and error rates of the single photon state in two
detections are given by
Q1,0 =
µ(1− ηA)
(1 + µ)2
Y1
Q1,1 =
µηA
(1 + µ)2
Y1
e1Y1 = edY1 + (e0 − ed)Y0B
(11)
where Y1 and e1 are given in Eq. (4) and (5), respectively.
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D. Perfect photon-number resolving detector
Here we will discuss the case that Alice uses a perfect photon-number resolving detector,
which can faithfully tell the number of photons in the incoming signal. That is, ηj|i = δij.
Thus the gains and QBER’s are given by, from Eqs. (7) and (8),
Qµ,i = Qi,i =
µi
(1 + µ)i+1
Yi
Eµ,iQµ,i = eiQi,i =
µi
(1 + µ)i+1
eiYi,
(12)
from where one can directly infer the gains and error rates of i-photon state, Qi,j = Qi,iδi,j.
IV. POST-PROCESSING
In the following discussion, we will focus on BB84 protocol [1]. Due to PNS attacks
[9, 14, 15], only vacuum states and single photon states are secure for BB84 protocol, which
may not be true for other protocols, such as SARG04 [40].
Similar to the coherent state QKD, we can apply GLLP [12] security analysis to the
triggering PDC QKD. First, Alice and Bob perform error correction, after which they will
share an identical key. Then, they perform privacy amplification to different types of qubits
separately. Since here we assume only vacuum states and single photon states are secure for
BB84 protocol, the key generation rate is given by [19, 41, 42]
R ≥ q{−f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)] +Q0}, (13)
where q is the basis reconciliation factor (1/2 for the BB84 protocol due to the fact that
half of the time Alice and Bob disagree with the bases, and if one uses the efficient BB84
protocol [43], q ≈ 1), the subscript µ denotes for the expected photon pair number, Qµ and
Eµ are the overall gain and QBER, Q1 and e1 are the gain and error rate of single photon
states, Q0 is the gain of vacuum states, f(x) is the bi-direction error correction efficiency
(see, for example, [44]) as a function of the error rate (normally f(x) ≥ 1 with the Shannon
limit f(x) = 1) and H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy function.
All the classical data measured can be grouped according to Alice’s detection events,
j = 0, 1, · · · , N . Then we can apply the GLLP idea [12, 45] to each group. The final key
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generation rate will be given by summing over contributions from all groups,
R =
N∑
j=0
Rj . (14)
In each case j, one can apply Eq.(23),
Rj ≥ q{−f(Eµ,j)Qµ,jH2(Eµ,j) +Q1,j[1−H2(e1)] +Q0,j}, (15)
where Q0,j and Q1,j are the first and second terms in the right hand side of Eq. (7). Here
the error rate of single photon state e1 is independent of j, see the observation in the end
of Section IIIB. We note that the key generation rate from all j-photon trigger detections
should be non-negative. If any of them contributes a negative key generation rate, we should
assign 0 to it. In this case, Alice and Bob can just discard that type of detections. Based
on this observation, we can further simplify Eq. (14). Given Alice detects more than one
photons, the probability of emitting single photon state in Bob’s arm is small [51]. As we
mentioned in the beginning of this section, only single photon state can contribute positively
to the final key rate. Thus we can focus on the case j = 0, 1.
R = R0 +R1, (16)
where R0 and R1 are given in Eq. (15). Again, both R0 and R1 should be non-negative,
otherwise should be assigned 0.
In Eq. (15), the gain Qµ,j and the QBER Eµ,j, given in Eqs. (7) and (8), can be measured
or tested from QKD experiments directly. In this section, we will discuss various ways to
estimate Q0,j , Q1,j , and e1. We assume that the PDC photon source and detector character-
istics are fixed and known to Alice. That is, µ, the photon number distribution in Eq. (3)
and ηA are fixed and known.
A. Non-decoy states with threshold detectors
Here we assume that Alice uses a threshold detector. Thus, Alice only has two measure-
ment outcomes, j = 0, 1. One simple way to estimate Q0,j , Q1,j , and e1 is by assuming that
all losses and errors come from the single photon states. This is because Eve can in princi-
ple perform PNS attacks on the multi-photon states. The gain and error rate of the single
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photon states in triggered (j = 1) and non-triggered (j = 0) detections can be bounded by
Q1,0 ≥ Qµ,0 −
∞∑
i=2
µi
(1 + µ)i+1
η0|i
= Qµ,0 −
(1− ηA)
2µ2
(1 + ηAµ)(1 + µ)2
Q1,1 ≥ Qµ,1 −
ηA(2− ηA + µ)µ
2
(1 + ηAµ)(1 + µ)2
e1,0 ≥
Eµ,0Qµ,0
Q1,0
e1,1 ≥
Eµ,1Qµ,1
Q1,1
(17)
where ηA is the efficiency of Alice’s detector. The gain Qµ and the QBER Eµ, given in
Eqs. (7) and (8), can be measured or tested from QKD experiments directly. In the following
simulations, we will use Eqs. (10). Since we assume all errors come from the single photon
states, one should take the lower bound of the vacuum contribution to be Q0,j = 0.
B. Infinite active decoy state with threshold detectors
To do privacy amplification, Alice and Bob need to bound Q0,j, Q1,j , and e1 for Eq. (15).
From Eq. (7), we know that to bound Q0,j and Q1,j , Alice and Bob need to estimate Y1.
Decoy state method provide a good way to estimate Y1 and e1 [16, 19]. The essential idea
is that instead of considering each linear equation of Y1 and e1 in the form of Eqs. (7) and
(8) separately, Alice and Bob consider all the linear equations simultaneously.
Let us imagine that Alice and Bob obtain an infinite number of linear equations in the
form of Eqs. (7) and (8), e.g., they use an infinite number of intensities µ. In principle,
Alice and Bob can solve the equations to get Y1 and e1 accurately. Mathematically, the
problem is solvable. The intuition is that the contributions from higher order terms of Yi
and ei decrease exponentially in Eqs. (7) and (8). For the case coherent state QKD, one or
two decoy states are proven to be sufficient [20]. Shortly, we will see that one decoy state is
sufficient for triggering PDC QKD.
We remark that the key underlying assumption of the decoy state method is [19]
Yi(decoy) = Yi(signal)
ei(decoy) = ei(signal).
(18)
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In another word, Eve sets the same values of Yi and ei for decoy and signal states. This can
be guaranteed by the assumption that Eve cannot distinguish decoy and signal states.
In Appendix A, we will show that the optimal µ for the infinite decoy state case is in the
order of 1, µ = O(1), which yields final key rate R = O(η). On the other hand, the optimal
µ for non-decoy case is µ = O(η), which yields final key rate R = O(η2). Therefore, we
expect the decoy state QKD to become a standard technique not only in the coherent state
QKD, but also in QKD with triggering PDC sources.
There are various ways to apply the decoy state idea to the triggering PDC QKD [34,
35, 36]. Here we consider the upper bound (infinite decoy state case) of all possible decoy
protocols of triggering PDC QKD with threshold detectors: triggering PDC+infinite decoy
method [19]. In the infinite decoy state method, Alice and Bob perform infinite number of
decoy states by choosing different intensities of the PDC source, µ. Then they can solve the
linear equations in the form of Eqs. (7) and (8) to estimate Y1 and e1 accurately. So they
can calculate each Q0,j , Q1,j, and e1 accurately. In the simulation, we will use Eqs. (10) and
(11) directly.
C. Weak active decoy state with threshold detectors
Here we assume that Alice and Bob use threshold detectors and focus on triggered de-
tection events. Alice uses another intensity ν, say by attenuating pumping laser, for the
weak decoy state. Wang, Wang and Guo have proposed a practical decoy method for trig-
gering PDC QKD [36], which is essentially applying vacuum+weak decoy state method [20].
Note that for triggered detection events, the vacuum contribution can be negligible since
ηA ≫ Y0A. Thus there is no need to estimate the vacuum contribution here. So Alice and
Bob only need to perform weak decoy state instead of vacuum+weak decoy states. In this
case, only one weak decoy state is sufficient.
Bounds of Y1 and e1 are given by µ
2(1 + ν)3 × Qν,1 − ν
2(1 + µ)3 × Qµ,1 in Eq. (7) and
Eq. (8)
Y1 ≥
1
ηA(µ− ν)
[
µ
ν
(1 + ν)3Qν|1 −
ν
µ
(1 + µ)3Qµ|1]
e1 ≤ min{
(1 + µ)2
µ
Eµ,1Qµ,1
ηAY1
,
(1 + ν)2
ν
Eν,1Qν,1
ηAY1
}
(19)
where ν is the expected photon pair number of the weak decoy state and ηA is the efficiency
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of Alice’s threshold detector.
It is not hard to show that when ν → 0, Eq. (19) approaches the infinite case, Eqs. (10)
and (11), described in the previous subsection.
D. Passive decoy state
Recently, Mauerer and Silberhorn proposed a passive decoy state scheme, in which
photon-number resolving detectors are required [34]. Let us recap the heuristic idea of
the original passive decoy state scheme briefly here. As discussed in the Section III, Alice
and Bob eventually get different detection events grouped by triggers on Alice’s side. The
key idea proposed by Mauerer and Silberhorn is that Alice and Bob manually combine the
{j}-trigger detection events to get the decoy states with different photon number statistics
and then follows regular decoy state scheme.
Here we want to point out that the “combination” step is unnecessary. In general, each
detection event group with j-trigger has a different photon number statistics on photon
source arm. Thus, what Alice and Bob need to do is treating all {j}-trigger detection events
statistics separately. Furthermore, photon-number resolving detectors are not necessary in
passive decoys state scheme. Our new generalized passive decoy state scheme is as follows.
1. Alice uses a PDC source as her triggered photon source. She detects one of the modes
from her PDC source as trigger and encode key information into another mode. Due
to the detector Alice uses, she will get different trigger events: j = 0, 1, · · · . When she
uses a threshold detector, she will only get j = 0, 1.
2. As usual BB84 protocol, Bob measures signals in two different bases. Alice and Bob
perform basis reconciliation.
3. Alice announces her trigger detection results for each pulse: j. Bob group his detection
events by the information j. For each j, they calculate the gainQµ,j and test the QBER
Eµ,j .
Mathematically, they will obtain a set of linear equations in the form of Eqs. (7) and
(8). Notice that the setup parameters, µ and ηj|i’s, are known to Alice and Bob. Thus,
they can estimate Y1 and e1 by considering Eqs. (7) and (8).
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4. Apply post-processing according to Eq. (16).
We remark that the scheme is called passive because Alice does not actively select decoy
states. Instead, she determines the decoy states by measuring the trigger mode. Later, we
will show that this is one advantage of using triggering PDC source for QKD. Actually, in
this case, there is no strict definitions of decoy states and signal states. In the original decoy
state method [20], decoy states are only used to estimate Y1 and e1 and the key is always
generated from signal states [52]. In triggering PDC QKD case, both the triggered j = 0
and non-triggered j = 1 detection events may have positive contribution to the final key
generation.
E. Passive decoy state with threshold detectors
Here we will review the decoy protocol proposed by Adachi, Yamamoto, Koashi and Imoto
[35] as a special case of the passive decoy state protocol. The AYKI protocol is interesting
in practice since it doesn’t involve any hardware change to implement decoy state.
Both Alice and Bob use threshold detectors, thus they have two types of detection events,
triggered (j = 1) and non-triggered (j = 0). Secure keys can be generated from both types
of detection events. Following the passive decoy state method procedure described in the
previous subsection, Alice and Bob can estimate Y1 and e1 by considering the statistics of
triggered and non-triggered detection events together. This is conceptually similar to one
decoy state idea [20].
By solving two linear equations of Eq. (7) with j = 0, 1, [1 − (1 − ηA)
2] × Qµ,0 − (1 −
ηA)
2 ×Qµ,1, one can get
Y1 ≥ Y
L
1 ≡
(1 + µ)2
µ
[
2− ηA
1− ηA
(Qµ,0 −Q0,0)−
1− ηA
ηA
Qµ,1] (20)
where Q0,0 is the vacuum state contribution in non-triggered detection events. One need
to minimize the key rate of Eq. (16) for Q0,0 with the constraint of Eq. (8). We note that
this result is essentially the Eq. (14) given in Ref. [35]. We can see that when ηA is close
to 1 or µ is small, after neglecting Qµ,0 (background counts), the lower bound Y
L
1 is tight
(approaches the real value of Y1, see Eq. (4)),
lim
ηA→1
Y L1 = lim
µ→0
Y L1 = η. (21)
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By neglecting the vacuum state contribution for triggered detection events, Q0,1 = 0, e1
can be simply estimated by
e1 ≤
Eµ,1Qµ,1
Q1,1
. (22)
To get the lower bound of Y1 in Eq. (20), one has to estimate the background contribution
Q0,0 as well. One simple bound of Q0,0 is 0 ≤ Q0,0e0 ≤ Eµ,0Qµ,0 from Eq. (8), where e0 = 1/2.
We note that the key rate calculated by substituting Eqs. (20) and (22) into Eq. (16) is
not optimal. To get a tighter key rate bound, one can numerically lower bound Eq. (16)
directly given the measurement results, Eq. (11).
F. With a perfect photon-number resolving detector
Here we discuss a special case that Alice uses a perfect photon-number resolving detector,
discussed in Section IIID. Now that Alice knows the exact photon number of the source,
Alice and Bob only need to focus the post-processing on the single photon state detection
events. In this case, the BB84 protocol is implemented by single photon states only. Thus,
they can directly apply Shor and Preskill’s formula [5, 33]
R ≥ qQ1[1− f(e1)H2(e1)−H2(e1)]. (23)
Later from the simulation, shown in Fig. 2, we can see that a perfect photon-number resolving
detector does not improve the QKD performance dramatically comparing to the threshold
detector case.
G. A few remarks
From the analysis of optimal µ in Appendix A, one can see that the key rate for the case
without decoy states quadratically depends on the channel loss, R = O(η2), while for the
case with decoy states, R = O(η). This result is consistent with prior work in comparing
the cases of coherent state QKD with and without decoy states [19].
In the decoy state security proof [19], the key assumption is that the decoy state and
signal state should satisfy Eq. (18). This is guaranteed by the assumption that Eve cannot
distinguish decoy and signal states. However, in the active decoy state method, Alice may
introduce side information that can distinguish decoy and signal states when she actively
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prepares decoy and signal states. For example, an attenuator on Alice’s side, used to prepare
different intensities for signal and decoy states, may introduce different frequency shifts for
signal and decoy states [24]. In general, it is hard to verify the assumption that Eve cannot
distinguish decoy and signal states in real active decoy state experiments.
In the passive decoy state scheme, decoy and signal states are passively determined by
Alice’s measurement outcome. Alice does not use an extra component (like in active decoy
state method) to prepare decoy states. This reduces the possibility of side information
leakage. By passively choosing decoy states, Alice prepares same states on Bob’s arm [53].
In fact, Alice can measure trigger signals after Bob finishes his measurements. Thus, to
Eve’s point of view, the states transmitted through the channel is independent of Alice’s
measurement results (j). Therefore, in principle, Eve cannot distinguish the decoy and
signal states in the passive decoy state QKD.
This is the main advantage to use passive decoy state methods. Note that for coherent
state QKD, one can only use active decoy state idea.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we will compare the passive decoy state with a perfect number resolving
detector and four QKD implementations with threshold detectors: non-decoy, infinite decoy,
weak active decoy and AYKI (passive decoy state).
We deduce experimental parameters from a recent PDC experiment [38], which are listed
in TABLE I. In the following simulations, we will use q = 1/2 and f(Eµ) = 1.22 in Eq. (15).
We notice that with the slightly modified experiment setup, a coherent state QKD with
decoy states has been implemented [38]. Thus, it is reasonable to use this experiment setup
to simulate the five QKD implementations.
In the simulation, for fair comparison, we always assume Bob uses the same detection
setup (with threshold detectors).
A. Without statistical fluctuations
In the first simulation, we consider the case that Alice and Bob performs an infinitely
long QKD (no statistical fluctuations). In this case the weak active decoy state protocol
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Frequency Wavelength ηA ηBob ed Y0B
249MHz 710 nm 14.5% 14.5% 1.5% 6.024 × 10−6
TABLE I: List of parameters from 144 km PDC experiment [38]. Here ηA and ηBob are the detection
efficiencies in Alice and Bob’s detection system, not including the optical channel loss. ed is the
intrinsic detector error rate. Y0B is the background count rate of Bob’s detection system (for
example, if Bob has two detectors, then Y0B will be the sum of two detectors’ background count
rates). The transmission efficiency η in Eq. (4) is given by ηBob plus the channel loss.
will approach the infinite decoy case [20]. We assume that Alice is able to adjust µ (the
brightness of the PDC source) in the regime of [0, 1] arbitrarily. In the simulation, we
numerically optimize µ for each of the four implementation protocols: non-decoy, infinite
decoy, AYKI and the case with a perfect number resolving detector. The simulation result
is shown in FIG. 2.
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FIG. 2: Plot of the key generation rate in terms of the optical loss, comparing four schemes without
considering statistical fluctuations: non-decoy, infinite decoy, AYKI and the case with a perfect
number resolving detector. Here we use q = 1/2 and f(Eµ) = 1.22. We numerically optimize µ for
each curve, see Appendix A for more discussions. Simulation parameters are listed in Table I.
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From FIG. 2, we have the following remarks.
1. In Appendix A, instead of numerically optimizing µ as done for Fig. (2), we quali-
tatively investigate the optimal µ for triggering PDC QKD with and without decoy
states. The simulation result is consistent with the qualitative conclusion R = O(η)
for the case with decoy state and R = O(η2) for the case without decoy state.
2. The space between the solid line and dashed line in FIG. 2 indicates the room left for
improvement by other decoy protocols with threshold detectors after AYKI protocol is
implemented. We can see that, in a large optical link loss regime, the performances of
AYKI and the infinite decoy are close. For instance, the AYKI protocol yields around
50% of the key rate of the infinite decoy state protocol when the channel loss is within
20dB.
3. By comparing AYKI and the case with a perfect photon-number resolving detector,
we can see that even with a perfect photon-number resolving detector on Alice’s side,
the key rate is not improved dramatically in a large optical loss regime.
4. The non-decoy protocol is better than AYKI in the regime close to maximal secure
distances. This is because we use the bounds of Eqs. (20) and (22) for AYKI curve.
In reality, Alice and Bob can use the bound of Eq. (17) directly in this regime.
5. There is a bump in each curve. This is due to the fact that in the key generation rate
formula Eq. (16), the non-triggered detection events have no contribution to the final
secure key after the bump.
6. At the point of loss=0 dB, the key rates of four cases (from top to bottom) are
1.21× 10−2, 8.6× 10−3, 4.2× 10−3 and 1.3× 10−3.
7. At the point of loss=0 dB, the numerical results for optimal µ for four cases (from
top to bottom) are: 1, 0.52, 0.194, 0.0589. The optimal µ for the case with a perfect
threshold detector is always 1, which is reasonable since µ = 1 maximizes the single
photon state probability. In Appendix A, we show that the optimal µ’s for the infinite
decoy and AYKI case are relatively stable in a large optical loss regime. The optimal
µ for the no decoy state case decreases with channel loss.
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8. We remark that the real µ used in the experiment [38] is µ = 0.0265. In general, it is
experimentally hard to increase the brightness (µ) of a PDC source.
9. All of the four cases can tolerate similar optical losses.
B. With statistical fluctuations
In a real experiment, the key length is always finite. Alice and Bob should consider sta-
tistical fluctuations. As pointed in Ref. [20], statistical fluctuation analysis is a complicated
problem in decoy state QKD.
Similar to the analysis in Ref. [20], we assume a few conditions:
1. Alice knows the exact value of average photon pair number µ, which is a fixed number
during key transmission.
2. The distribution of photon number, Eq. (3), does not fluctuate.
3. Assume the QKD transmission is part of an infinite length experiment.
Here we focus on the three cases with threshold detectors: infinite decoy, weak decoy
and AYKI. We assume that the data size is 6 × 109 pulses of Alice’s pumping laser. The
simulation result is shown in FIG. 3. From the simulation result, we have the following
observations.
1. Similar to the case without fluctuation analysis, in a large optical link loss regime, the
performances of AYKI and the infinite decoy are close.
2. At the point of loss=0 dB, the key rates of the three cases from top to bottom are
8.6× 10−3 (infinite), 5.0× 10−3 (weak) and 4.7× 10−3 (AYKI).
3. The maximal tolerable secure optical losses for three cases are rather similar: 37dB
(infinite), 32.5dB (AYKI), 32dB (weak).
4. The AYKI protocol yields a higher key rate than weak decoy state protocol when the
loss is greater than 16 dB. AYKI is less affected by statistical fluctuations than the
weak decoy state because in AYKI, Alice does not need to sacrifice extra pulses for
decoy states.
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FIG. 3: Plot of the key generation rate in terms of the optical loss, comparing three cases with
threshold detectors after considering statistical fluctuations: infinite decoy, weak active decoy and
AYKI. We numerically optimize µ for each curve. Here we use q = 1/2 and f(Eµ) = 1.22. In
the weak decoy state case, we assume Alice can randomly attenuate her PDC source intensity.
Simulation parameters are listed in Table I. The data size is 6 × 109 pumping laser pulses on
Alice’s side.
In Section IVG, we pointed out that from a practical security point of view, the passive
decoy state method has an advantage over active decoy state methods. Also, AYKI method
does not require any additional hardware change to implement decoy state, while in the
weak decoy state case, Alice needs to add an attenuator to create decoy states. Now, from
the simulation result, we can see that AYKI and weak active decoy state method yields
similar QKD performance. Thus, our conclusion is that one should just use AYKI method
instead of the weak decoy state method.
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VI. CONCLUSION
By investigating the optimal photon source intensity, we find that the triggering PDC
QKD setup with decoy states is able to achieve a key rate that linearly depends on the
channel transmittance, comparing to the quadratic dependence for the case without decoy
states. Therefore, we expect the decoy state QKD to become a standard technique not only
in the coherent state QKD, but also in QKD with triggering PDC sources.
On the practical side, we generalize the passive decoy state idea. The generalized passive
decoy state idea can be applied to cases where either threshold detectors or photon number
resolving detectors are used. The decoy protocol proposed by Adachi, Yamamoto, Koashi
and Imoto (AYKI) can be treated as a special case of the generalized passive decoy state
method. Comparing to the active (regular) decoy state methods, the passive one opens
less possibility for Eve to distinguish decoy and signal states, which is a key underlying
assumption in the security proof of decoy state QKD. From this sense, the passive decoy
state method is more secure than the active decoy state methods in practice.
By simulating a recent PDC experiment, we compare various practical decoy state pro-
tocols with the infinite decoy protocol. We also compare the cases using threshold detectors
and photon-number resolving detectors. Our simulation result shows that with the AYKI
protocol, one can achieve a key generation rate that is close to the theoretical limit of in-
finite decoy protocol. Furthermore, our simulation result suggests that a photon-number
resolving detector has little room to improve the QKD performance, comparing to the case
using threshold detectors.
We also consider the statistical fluctuations. We compare infinite decoy protocol, weak
active decoy state method and AYKI protocol. The simulation result shows that the weak
active decoy state method and AYKI protocol yield very close QKD performance. In a large
optical loss regime, the AYKI protocol can achieve a performance that is close to the infinite
decoy case. Since the AYKI protocol requires no hardware changes for triggering PDC QKD,
we conclude that AYKI method is a good protocol for triggering PDC QKD experiments.
Although our analysis is focused on the QKD with PDC sources, we emphasize that it
can also be applied to other QKD setups with triggered single photon sources.
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APPENDIX A: OPTIMAL µ
The optimal µ for the coherent state QKD with and without decoy states has already been
studied [20]. Here instead of numerically optimizing µ as done for Fig. (2), we qualitatively
investigate the optimal µ for the triggering PDC QKD with and without decoy states. Here
we are interested in the case that Alice uses a threshold detector.
1. Without decoy states
Let us begin with the optimal µ of the case without decoy states. Here we will apply
GLLP [12] security analysis. As shown in Ref. [46], GLLP and Lu¨tkenhaus’s [8] security
analyses achieve similar performances for the coherent state QKD. Intuitively, we should get
a similar optimal µ as given in Ref. [8], µ ≈ η/2.
From Eq. (10), we can see that the gain Qµ,j (j = 0, 1) is in the order of µη. To keep
Q1,0 or Q1,1 in Eq. (17) positive, µ should be in the order of η. By assuming µ, η and Y0B
are small, we can simplify Eq. (10)
Qµ,0 +Qµ,1 ≈ ηµ
Eµ,0 ≈ Eµ,0 ≈ ed
QL1,0 +Q
L
1,1 ≈ ηµ− µ
2
eU1 ≈
ηed
η − µ
(A1)
where QL1,0 + Q
L
1,1 is the lower bound of Q1,0 + Q1,1 and e
U
1 is the upper bound of e1 from
Eq. (17). Since the error rates from triggered (j = 1) and non-triggered (j = 0) detection
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events are the same, the key generation rate given by Eq. (23) can be simplified to
R ≥ q{−f(Eµ)QµH2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)] +Q0}
≈ q{−f(ed)ηµH2(ed) + (ηµ− µ
2)[1−H2(
ηed
η − µ
)]}
(A2)
By taking derivative of R, the optimal µ ≡ xη satisfies
− f(ed)H2(ed) + 1− 2x+ ed log2
ed
1− x
+ (1− ed − 2x) log2(1−
ed
1− x
) = 0. (A3)
Here if set ed = 0, then we get x = 1/2 which is compatible with Lu¨kenthaus’ result [8]. We
note that x = 1/2 essentially maximize the probability of single photon source QL1,0 + Q
L
1,1
in Eq. (A1). More precisely, we can solve Eq. (A3) numerically, see FIG. 4.
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FIG. 4: Plot of the optimal µ in terms of ed for triggering PDC+non-decoy. Here we use f(ed) =
1.22 since the error rate is less 10% [44].
From FIG. 4, we can see that the optimal µ for triggering PDC+non-decoy is µ = O(η),
which will lead the final key generation rate R = O(η2).
2. With decoy states
With decoy states, Alice and Bob can estimate Q1 and e1 better. Here we consider the
infinite decoy state case with threshold detectors. Under the assumption that η and Y0B are
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small, we can simplify Eqs. (10) and (11),
Qµ,0 +Qµ,1 ≈ ηµ
Eµ,0 ≈ Eµ,0 ≈ ed
Q1,0 +Q1,1 ≈
ηµ
(1 + µ)2
e1 ≈ ed
(A4)
With these approximations, the key generation rate given in Eq. (23) can be simplified
to
R ≈ q{−f(ed)ηµH2(ed) +
ηµ
(1 + µ)2
[1−H2(ed)]}. (A5)
The optimal µ satisfies
1− µ
(1 + µ)3
=
f(ed)H2(ed)
1−H2(ed)
(A6)
Here if set ed = 0, then we get µ = 1 with which the probability to get a single photon state
is maximized. The numerical result of Eq. (A6) is shown in FIG. 5.
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FIG. 5: Plot of the optimal µ in terms of ed for the triggering PDC+infinite decoy. Here we
usef(ed) = 1.22.
From FIG. 5, similar to the case coherent state QKD with decoy states [20], one can see
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that the optimal µ is independent of channel loss η for the infinite decoy state case with
threshold detectors, i.e., µ = O(1), which will lead the final key generation rate R = O(η).
3. Numerical checking
Now we would like to numerically compare the optimal µ with and without decoy states
by simulating a recent PDC experiment [38], with parameters listed in Table I. In the
simulation, we numerically optimize µ for the key rate given by Eq. (16) for the non-decoy
and infinite decoy methods. For this particular setup, the optimal µ is shown in Figure 6.
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FIG. 6: Plot of the optimal µ in terms of optical loss for triggering PDC+non-decoy and triggering
PDC+infinite-decoy. Here we use q = 1/2 and f(Eµ) = 1.22. Simulation parameters are listed in
Table I.
From the figure we can see that the optimal µ for the non-decoy case is in the order of η,
while the optimal µ for the infinite-decoy case is in the order of 1. This is consistent with
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the results of the analysis in the two previous subsections.
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